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A REAPPRAISAL OF THE TAXATION OF
WEALTH TRANSFERS INCIDENT TO DIVORCE
John P. Steines*
Transfers of wealth between former spouses incident to their divorce'
take a variety of forms. For federal income tax purposes, two broad categories of transfers are significant: recurring cash payments, or "alimony," and lump-sum transfers of cash or other property, particularly
appreciated property.
Two distinct but inextricably related regimes exist for taxing these
transfers. Under the first regime, recurring cash payments from husband
to wife2 are deductible by the husband and constitute income to the wife,
but only if the payments discharge the husband's marital obligation to
support his wife. 3 Under the second regime, the lump-sum transfer of
appreciated property from husband to wife results in a taxable gain to the
husband and a "stepped-up" (fair market value) basis to the wife, but
again only where the transfer is in the nature of support. 4 Transfers in the
nature of support may be contrasted with the husband's relinquishment
of his wife's property. Although this contrast is often helpful, it is not
self-evident, and perhaps not even correct, that a transfer in the nature of
support is necessarily the converse of a relinquishment of the wife's property. Yet, the mutual exclusivity of such transfers is the linchpin of deci5
sion making in this area of tax law.

The often attenuated distinction between a wife's right to support from
her husband and her property rights in the marital wealth causes excessive
uncertainty of tax consequences. Variations in state laws defining the
wife's property rights exacerbate the problem, leading to the danger of
*
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I. For purposes of this article, the phrase "transfers incident to divorce" refers to the total settlement of marital wealth (including ongoing obligations financed by future earnings) decided upon
(either by agreement or decree) as terms of the divorce. The remarks in this article are generally
applicable to transfers incident to less permanent conjugal interruptions as well. See I.R.C. §

71(a)(2), (3).
2. For convenience, throughout this article the transferring spouse will be the husband and the
receiving spouse the wife. See I.R.C. § 7701(a)(17).
3. I.R.C. §§ 71,215. See text accompanying notes 39-41 infra.
4. United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962). See text accompanying notes 62-63 infra. This
"support" nomenclature may evoke disagreement over the precise holding in Davis and its relationship with the treatment of recurring payments. The text accompanying note 98 infra develops more
elaborately what is expressed only as a conclusion here.
5. See text accompanying notes 39-41 and 62-63 infra.
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discriminatory taxation. Not surprisingly, then, the rule in United States
v. Davis6 that the transfer of appreciated property can generate taxable
gain to the husband has suffered wide and harsh criticism. 7 Proposals for
remedial legislation are numerous. 8 Curiously, critics have relatively seldom discussed the effect of the support-versus-property distinction on the
treatment of periodic cash payments; 9 curious because periodic cash payments are a common means of settling marital wealth. One surmises that
taxpayers and the revenue are affected more by this regime of taxation
than by the rule on transfers of appreciated property. 10 Moreover, the regimes, though separate, are so functionally interrelated under present law
that revision of one will necessarily alter the role and integrity of the
other.
Given the outpouring of proposals to overrule Davis, congressional action in the reasonably near future is not unlikely. The intent of this article
is to inspire a review of the entire area of wealth transfers incident to
divorce; to take the scope of review beyond fixation on Davis, with the
view of integrating the present regimes in a scheme that is less dependent
on the subtle and often invisible distinction between support and property
rights. The article discusses first, the purpose of the rules governing periodic cash payments; second, the evolution of the rule on transfers of appreciated property; third, an assessment of the need for reform; and
fourth, a proposal for unified treatment of all marital wealth transfers,
influenced primarily by the objective of allocating income and the attendant tax liability simply and equitably between husband and wife.
TREATMENT OF ALIMONY PAYMENTS
The present statutory pattern for taxing alimony payments was enacted
in 1942.11 The original objectives of this scheme, though not its mechanics, remain useful as guides for current reform. To understand these objectives, a brief review of prior law is in order.
Law Before the Revenue Act of 1942
Before 1942, periodic cash payments of alimony were neither deducti6.

370 U.S. 65 (1962).

7. See note 89 infra.
8. See note 127 infra.
9. See note 129 infra.
10. The Internal Revenue Service estimated that over 461,000 taxpayers claimed deductions for
alimony in excess of one billion dollars in 1975. U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, STATISTICS OF INCOME.
INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS 55 (1975). More recent figures apparently are not available.

11. Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753, § 120, 56 Stat. 816-18 (now I.R.C.
72(k), 215, 682).
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ble by the husband nor includible in the wife's income. 12 The Code 13 simply did not provide for a deduction and the Supreme Court ruled that the
receipt of alimony is not an accession to income. 14 Thus, alimony payments were treated the same as the cost of supporting a spouse during
marriage, of tax significance to neither spouse. As a result, husbands
were subject to taxation not only on the income they retained, but also on
that which was paid over as alimony. Progressive tax rates aggravated the
hardship. In extreme cases alimony payments left the husband with insufficient income to pay the tax. 15 One of the purposes of the alimony provisions in the Revenue Act of 1942 was to alleviate this inequity. 16
If instead of making direct alimony payments, the husband transferred
income-producing property to a trust for his wife's benefit, a slightly different issue arose. According to a series of Supreme Court decisions beginning with Douglas v. Willcuts, 17 the income of such "alimony trusts"
was taxable to the husband unless the arrangement worked a complete
discharge of his duty to support his wife. The theory was that application
of trust income against a continuing support obligation is tantamount to8
receipt of the income by the husband followed by payment to the wife. '
The principle that a taxpayer realizes income when his debts are paid
by a third party is unassailable, but why its application in the alimony
trust area was limited to situations where the support obligation survived
divorce merits analysis. In Helvering v. Fuller,19 the only Supreme Court
case finding that the alimony trust completely extinguished the husband's
duty of support under state law, the Court reasoned that such a transfer
should be treated the same as an outright transfer of the corpus in full
satisfaction of the support obligation. In each instance, the argument
went, the wife, as a creditor who has accepted a property interest in release of her claim, is responsible for tax on the income from the property.
In his dissent, 20 Mr. Justice Reed maintained that whether the support
obligation survives divorce should be irrelevant. Even where the alimony
trust extinguishes the support duty, he argued, creation of the trust is a
12.
13.
14.
15.
Cong.,
16.

Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151 (1917).
All such references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect at the relevant time.
Gouldv. Gould, 245 U.S. 151 (1917).
Hearings Before House Comm. on Ways and Means on Revenue Revision of 1942, 77th
2d Sess. 92 (1942) (statement of Randolph Paul).
H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77thCong., 2dSess. 71-72(1942);S. REP. No. 1631,77thCong., 2d

Sess. 83 (1942).
17. 296 U.S. 1 (1935). Subsequent cases were Helvering v. Leonard, 310 U.S. 80 (1940); Helvering v. Fuller, 310 U.S. 69 (1940); Helvering v. Fitch, 309 U.S. 149 (1940).
18. Cf. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929) (employer's payment of
employee's income taxes is income to employee).
19. 310 U.S. 69(1940).
20. Id. at 76.
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prior appropriation of future income to discharge that duty. Analogizing a
transfer in trust which extinguishes the husband's duty to an outright
transfer of corpus (income taxable to the wife) was, in his opinion, no
more compelling than equating the transfer in trust with a retention of
corpus by the husband and use of the income to support his wife (income
taxable to the husband).
The Court and Mr. Justice Reed were struggling subliminally with a
familiar issue in taxation, one whose implications are just beneath the
surface in the treatment of transfers incident to divorce: who is the owner
of property and hence the party responsible for the tax on income from the
property? 2 1 Mr. Justice Reed could understandably object to entirely relieving Mr. Fuller of tax liability on the transaction. But to tax Mr. Fuller
indefinitely on income from property he no longer owned is repugnant to
the general principle that one who owns property must pay the tax on its
income. 22 If state law provides that a transfer of property to an alimony
trust extinguishes the husband's duty to support his wife, the appropriate
exaction, if any, is to tax the husband only on the gain inherent in the
property at the time of the transfer, rather than on the continuing stream
of income generated from the property. The Supreme Court sanctioned
this approach in a related context twenty years later in Davis,23 but no
24
hint of it can be found in the alimony trust cases.
21. See Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579 (1941); Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940):
Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937).
22. The cases cited in note 21 supra are part of the assignment of income doctrine, which holds
that the owner of property is the person responsible for tax on income from the property, even if
someone else receives the income. See Lyon & Eustice, Assignment ofIncome: Fruit and Tree as
Irrigatedby the P.G. Lake Case, 17 TAX L. REv. 295 (1962). Although the government did not
specifically raise the issue in Fuller, the Court questioned, but declined to rule, whether the husband
had retained sufficient control over the trust to be regarded as the continuing owner of the corpus
under Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940). 310 U.S. at 76. The dissent was similarly troubled. 310 U.S. at 79. Clifford was the precursor of the present grantor trust rules, I.R.C. §§
671-678, which now prescribe exclusive conditions that result in the treatment of a grantor as the
owner of property in trust and consequently taxable on income from the property. The grantor trust
rules do not operate to tax the husband on income from an alimony trust. I.R.C. § 682(a). See note 38
infra.
23. United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962). See text accompanying notes 60-62 infra.
24. In Mesta v. Commissioner, 42 B.T.A. 933 (1940), rev'd, 123 F.2d 986 (3d Cir. 1941), cert.
denied, 316 U.S. 695 (1942), where the husband transferred appreciated securities directly to his
wife in satisfaction of his support obligation, the government asserted that the husband realized a
taxable gain on the transfer. The Board distinguished dictum in Fullerthat supported the government
on the ground that Fuller involved taxation of the wife, not the husband. See text accompanying note
54 infra. It wasn't until later that the unavoidable relationship between the alimony trust cases and
direct transfers crystallized. Spruance v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 141 (1973), aff'd mem., 505 F.2d
731 (3d Cir. 1974). In Spruance, where the husband transferred appreciated securities to an irrevocable alimony trust for the exclusive benefit of his former wife and children, the government conceded,
to the detriment of the revenue, that the transfer was a taxable event under Davis.

Divorce Wealth Transfers
In any event, determining whether creation of an alimony trust extinguished the husband's support obligation was chancy business. A function of state law and the terms of the divorce papers, this "finality rule,"
as Mr. Justice Reed styled it,25 turned on whether the divorce court had
ongoing authority to modify the husband's obligation if future circumstances warranted. If so, the support duty survived divorce and the husband was taxable on income from the alimony trust; if not, the wife was
taxable. Under the finality rule, results varied with state law, not to mention the effect of language employed in the divorce papers. 26 To produce
uniformity of results, Congress abolished the finality rule, making it no
longer relevant for tax purposes whether the husband's support duty survives divorce. Uniformity was the second major purpose of the Revenue
27
Act of 1942's alimony provisions.
Congressional dissatisfaction with the vagaries of the finality rule in
1942 is an ironic reminder of the faults in the present system. The same
genre of criteria which then determined whether the husband's support
duty survived divorce now determine whether a transfer of wealth incident to divorce is in the nature of support, a finding that controls the treatment of periodic cash payments as well as one-time transfers of property. 28 To repair the present system, Congress would do well to harken to
its objectives in 1942: to tax income to the recipient and to minimize the
effect of state law. These goals remain significantly unmet.
PresentLaw andIts Intended Purpose
The provisions enacted in 1942 are chiefly embodied in sections 71 and
215 of the Code. 29 In general, section 71 provides that periodic payments
which the divorce papers impose on the husband in recognition of his
marital duty of support are includible in the wife's income. 30 Section 215
25. Helvering v. Fuller, 310 U.S. 69,78 (1940).
26. See generally R. PAUL, STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION 243-95 (3d series 1940); Gomick,
Alimony and the Income Tax, 29 CORNELL L. Q. 28 (1943).
27. H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 72 (1942); S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d
Sess. 83 (1942). Alimony trust income is now taxable to the wife under I.R.C. § 71 or 682, regardless of whether the husband's support obligation is extinguished. See note 38 infra.
28. See H. CLARK, LAW OF DoMESrc RELATos § 14.9, at 455 (1968), and compare with text
accompanying notes 66-72 infra.
29. I.R.C. §§ 71, 215. The amendments were in the Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753,
§ 120, 56 Stat. 816-18 [codified in Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, §§ 22(k) (now I.R.C. § 71), 23(u)
(now I.R.C. §215), 171 (now I.R.C. §682), 22(b)(2) (now I.R.C. §72(k))].
30. Section 71 also applies to payments received pursuant to a written separation agreement and
to a decree for separate maintenance or support. It reads as follows:
§71. Alimony and separate maintenance payments
(a) General rule.(1) Decree of divorce or separate maintenance.-If a wife is divorced or legally sepa-
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grants a corresponding deduction to the husband. 31 Thus the general idea
is to tax the husband only on that portion of his income which he retains
and to tax the wife on the portion she receives. For this reason it is often
said that the scheme works a kind of income splitting.
The committee reports establish that income is the intended touchstone
rated from her husband under a decree of divorce or of separate maintenance, the wife's
gross income includes periodic payments (whether or not made at regular intervals) received after such decree in discharge of (or attributable to property transferred, in trust or
otherwise, in discharge of) a legal obligation which, because of the marital or family relationship, is imposed on or incurred by the husband under the decree or under a written
instrument incident to such divorce or separation.
(2) Written separation agreement.-If a wife is separated from her husband and there is
a written separation agreement executed after the date of the enactment of this title, the
wife's gross income includes periodic payments (whether or not made at regular intervals)
received after such agreement is executed which are made under such agreement and because of the marital or family relationship (or which are attributable to property transferred,
in trust or otherwise, under such agreement and because of such relationship). This paragraph shall not apply if the husband and wife make a single return jointly.
(3) Decree for support.-If a wife is separated from her husband, the wife's gross income includes periodic payments (whether or not made at regular intervals) received by her
after the date of the enactment of this title from her husband under a decree entered after
March 1, 1954, requiring the husband to make the payments for her support or maintenance. This paragraph shall not apply if the husband and wife make a single return jointly.
(b) Payments to support minor children.-Subsection (a) shall not apply to that part of any
payment which the terms of the decree, instrument, or agreement fix, in terms of an amount of
money or a part of the payment, as a sum which is payable for the support of minor children of
the husband. For purposes of the preceding sentence, if any payment is less than the amount
specified in the decree, instrument, or agreement, then so much of such payment as does not
exceed the sum payable for support shall be considered a payment for such support.
(c) Principal sum paid in installments.(1) General rule.-For purposes of subsection (a), installment payments discharging a
part of an obligation the principal sum of which is, either in terms of money or property.
specified in the decree, instrument, or agreement shall not be treated as periodic payments.
(2) Where period for payment is more than 10 years.-If, by the terms of the decree.
instrument, or agreement, the principal sum referred to in paragraph (1) is to be paid or may
be paid over a period ending more than 10 years from the date of such decree, instrument,
or agreement, then (notwithstanding paragraph (1)) the installment payments shall be
treated as periodic payments for purposes of subsection (a), but (in the case of any one
taxable year of the wife) only to the extent of 10 percent of the principal sum. For purposes
of the preceding sentence, the part of any principal sum which is allocable to a period after
the taxable year of the wife in which it is received shall be treated as an installment payment
for the taxable year in which it is received.
(d) Rule for husband in case of transferred property.-The husband's gross income does not
include amounts received which, under subsection (a), are (1) includible in the gross income of
the wife, and (2) attributable to transferred property.
I.R.C. §71.
31. In the case of a husband described in section 71, there shall be allowed as a deduction
amounts includible under section 71 in the gross income of his wife, payment of which is made
within the husband's taxable year. No deduction shall be allowed under the preceding sentence
with respect to any payment, if by reason of section 71(d) or 682, the amount thereof is not
includible in the husband's gross income.
I.R.C. § 215.

Divorce Wealth Transfers
of the scheme. Congress was primarily concerned with the husband who
must resort to a recurring stream of income to pay alimony. 32 Nonetheless, sections 71 and 215 apply without regard to the source of the alimony. The husband may deduct, and the wife must include, payments
described in section 71 irrespective of how much income the husband
has. 33 Furthermore, deductible alimony can in fact be paid out of capital
34
and the committee reports say so expressly.
Why Congress deviated from a strict income standard is not clear. Doing so was essential neither to effectuate income splitting nor to remove
the uncertainty of dependence on state law, the stated reasons for the new
rules. Statements in the committee reports alluding to payments from the

husband's capital involve transfers of property to the wife which produce
a flow of wealth consisting in part of the husband's capital. 35 The example used in the reports is a single premium annuity contract purchased by
the husband and assigned to his wife. 36 The monthly annuity payments
would have been partly a return of capital to the husband, but nonetheless
are taxable in full to the wife. 37 Whatever reasons Congress had for this
questionable "creation" of income, the mainstream of its thinking was to
32. The existing law does not tax alimony payments to the wife who receives them, nor does it
allow the husband to take any deduction on account of alimony payments made by him. He is
fully taxable on his entire net income even though a large portion of his income goes to his wife
as alimony or as separate maintenance payments. The increased surtax rates would intensify this
hardship and in many cases the husband would not have sufficient income left after paying alimony to meet his income tax obligations.
The bill would correct this situation by taxing alimony and separate maintenance payments to
the wife receiving them, and by relieving the husband from tax upon that portion of such payments which constitutes income to him under the present law.
H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1942) (emphasis added). To the same effect is S. REP.
No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 83 (1942).
33. Deductions under § 215 do not generate a net operating loss that can be carried over as a
deduction to other years. See I.R.C. § 172(a),(c),(d)(4). In the abstract, therefore, alimony provides
a tax benefit only to the extent of the husband's income for the year of payment. However, income
can be offset by alimony which is paid from preexisting property. The support requirement in § 71
attempts to prevent this, but does so imperfectly. See text accompanying note 42 infra.
34. H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 72 (1942). S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d
Sess. 84 (1942). The concern expressed here was with full inclusion to the wife regardless of the
source of the payment, rather than deductibility to the husband. See Gallatin Welsh Trust v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 1398 (1951), aff'd sub nom., Girard Trust Corn Exch. Bank v. Commissioner, 194
F.2d 708 (3d Cir. 1952) (alimony paid from trust corpus taxable to wife); note 38 infra.
35. Although the statements are concerned primarily with property transfers, the precise language is slightly broader: "Thus, it matters not that such payments are attributable to property in
trust, to life insurance, endowment or annuity contracts, or to any other interest in property, or are
paid directly or indirectly by the obligor husband from his income or capital." H.R. REP. No. 2333,
77th Cong., 2d Sess. 72 (1942); S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 84 (1942); accord, Treas.
Reg. § 1.71-1(c)(2) (1957). See note 38 infra.
36. H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 72 (1942); S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d
Sess. 84 (1942).
37. See I.R.C. § 72(k).
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split up the tax liability on the husband's income according to who received it.38 Proof of this lies in the conditions in section 71.
The Support Requirement
By its terms, section 71 applies only to payments imposed on the husband "because of the marital or family relationship." 39 The Treasury
38. The Code specifically provides that both the income and capital elements of annuity payments under an annuity, endowment or life insurance contract are includible in the wife's income if
the payments are described in § 71. I.R.C. §72(k). The same applies to life insurance proceeds paid
by reason of the insured's death. I.R.C. § 101(e). In both instances, the payments are neither includible in the husband's income, nor deductible to him. I.R.C. §§ 71(d), 215. These rules come into play
only where the contract is transferred to, or assigned for the benefit of, the wife, i.e., where the wife
is the contractual beneficiary. (A simpler example, uncomplicated by the distinction between income
and capital, is a transfer of stock to the wife to discharge the husband's support obligation. The
dividends are includible in the wife's income and are neither includible nor deductible to the husband.)
These rules are equally applicable, though considerably more complex, where the transfer to the
wife is in trust. Regardless of whether the transfer extinguishes the husband's support duty under
state law, the wife is taxable on the trust income as a beneficiary. Where the trust is created incident
to the divorce or incorporated by reference in the divorce papers, the income is taxable to the wife
under I.R.C. § 71(a) and excluded from the husband's income under I.R.C. §71(d). Where the trust
is completely independent of the divorce status, the income is taxable to the wife and excluded from
the husband's income under I.R.C. § 682(a). See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.71-1(c)(3) (1957),
1.682(a)-l(a)(2) (1957). In neither instance is the husband entitled to a deduction. I.R.C. § 215.
Important differences exist, however, in the treatment of the wife under § 71 and § 682(a). For
example, under the latter, but not the former, the wife's income cannot exceed the trust's income;
capital flows through to the wife tax-free. See Treas. Reg. § 1.682(a)-I(a)(2) (1957). Other issues
are whether § 71 overrides various general rules which § 682 accommodates, such as the exclusion
from income under I.R.C. § 103 for interest on government obligations. See Ellis v. United States.
416 F.2d 894 (6th Cir. 1969).
The discussion here is intentionally superficial and studiously avoids the hairsplitting details. For a
thorough analysis of alimony payments attributable to transferred property, see Peschel, Income Taxation ofAlimony Payments Attributable to TransferredProperty: CongressionalConfusion, 44 TuL.
L. REv. 223 (1970); Del Cotto, The Alimony Trust: Its Relationship with SubchapterJ; The Right to
Amortize Basis, 33 TAx L. REv. 577 (1978). All of this is raised here merely to show that no theme
emerges to explain why Congress chose a few specific divorce transactions in which to obliterate the
distinction between income and capital. If the desire was to tax the wife on every accession, why does
§ 682 protect the wife from taxation on the husband's capital? Moreover, why was nothing done to
make the wife taxable on a lump sum transfer in satisfaction of her support rights? See United States
v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 73 n.7 (1962). Random departures from the income standard should not
impair recognition of income splitting as the key to alimony taxation. But cf. Luckenbach v. Pedrick,
214 F.2d 914 (2d Cir. 1954) (wife taxable on alimony paid by husband's father); Neeman v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 864 (1956), aff'dpercuriam,255 F.2d 841 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 841
(1958) (wife taxable on alimony despite fact that source was husband's tax exempt income); Gallatin
Welsh Trust v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 1398 (1951), aff'd sub nom., Girard Trust Corn Exch. Bank
v. Commissioner, 194 F.2d 708 (3d Cir. 1952) (alimony paid from trust corpus taxable to wife).
39. I.R.C. § 71(a)(1),(2). Section 71(a)(3), which covers payments under a decree for support,
literally applies to payments for "'support or maintenance," without mentioning the marital or family
relationship. I.R.C. § 71(a)(3). This provision was introduced by the Senate in the 1954 recodification and nothing in its report suggests that the omission of the phrase is significant. See S. REP. No.
1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 10- 1,170-71 (1954).
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Regulations elaborate by confining the scope of section 71 to payments
made "because of the family or marital relationship in recognition of the
general obligation to support. "40 The regulations illustrate by excluding
from section 71 repayment of a previous loan from the wife. The origin of
this so-called "support" requirement is in the committee reports accompanying the Revenue Act of 1942:41
This section applies only where the legal obligation being discharged arises
out of the family or marital relationship in recognition of the general obligation to support, which is made specific by the instrument or decree. This
section does not apply to that part of any periodic payment attributable to
any interest in the property so transferred, which interest originally belonged to the wife, unless she received it from her husband in contemplation
of or as an incident to the divorce or separation without adequate and full
consideration in money or money's worth, other than the release of the husband or his property from marital obligations.
Writers have wondered whether the support requirement is merely a
gloss on the "marital or family relationship" language or an attempt to
differentiate deflections of income from divisions of capital. 42 It probably
is both, for both explanations say the same thing. Take the situation in the
report quoted above where the husband transfers to the wife property that
originally belonged to her. One hardly can say that the husband is supporting the wife by conveying to her that which she already owned independently of the marital relationship. But what does this have to do with
income tax consequences? The support requirement simply tries to assure, in a very crude manner, that income cannot be shifted where income
does not exist. The presence of a payment in the nature of support signals
the shifting of income from husband to wife, or obversely, the absence of
a division of preexisting capital. The wife's receipt of support is to be
distinguished from an extraction of her property, the previous accession
to which has already been subjected to normal rules of income taxation.
To explain the requirement as a means of distinguishing divisions of
income and capital is to restate the same idea in different words. Either
explanation perceives the support requirement as a turnstile through
which pass only those payments which effectuate the overriding policy of
income splitting. This view does not perfectly explain the treatment of all

40. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(a)(4) (1957).
41. H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 72 (1942); S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d
Sess. 84 (1942).
42. See Harris, The FederalIncome Tax Treatment of Alimony Payments-The "Support" Requirement of the Regulations, 22 HASTINGS L. J. 53, 57-60 (1970), and the authority discussed

therein.
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transfers of wealth incident to divorce, 43 but it does furnish a perspective
of the support requirement that is consonant with the policy fostered by
44
the 1942 legislation.
The PeriodicRequirement
Section 71 also requires that the payments be periodic. The legislative
history gives no reason for this requirement. The Code does not define
periodic, other than to say in section 71 (c) that installment payments discharging a principal sum are not periodic. An exception to this rule is for
installments payable over a period ending more than ten years after the
divorce. 45 The regulations set out elaborate rules for determining whether
payments are periodic. 46 Echoing section 71(c), they treat installment
payments of a principal sum as periodic only if payable over a period
ending more than ten years after the divorce, and then only to the extent
of ten percent of the principal sum each year. 47 Payments which terminate
within ten years of the divorce are not periodic. 48 Regardless of the period
over which the payments are made, however, they are treated as periodic
in full, if subject to certain contingencies. 49 These contingencies, which
may be imposed either by the divorce papers or by state law, are the death
of either spouse, remarriage of the wife or a change in the economic status of either spouse.
These rather complicated provisions may be reduced to a simple test,
subject to a single qualification. If contingencies make the total amount to
be paid theoretically unascertainable at the time of the divorce, the payments are periodic. If the amount is ascertainable and is payable over a
period ending more than ten years after divorce, the payments are periodic up to ten percent of the total amount each year. 50 No other payments
are periodic.
Why should the ability to ascertain how much the wife will receive
govern tax consequences? Like the support requirement, the periodic requirement can be viewed as a roundabout method of limiting section 71 to
a shifting of income. If the amount is fixed, regardless of what the future
43. See id. at 59; note 38 supra.
44. See Warnack v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 541, 550-51 (1979) (adopting an income-splitting
approach to the support requirement).
45. I.R.C. § 71(c), text quoted at note 30 supra.
46. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1 (d) (I957).
47. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1 (d) (1), (2), (5) ex. (4)(1957).
48. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1 (d) (3), (5)ex. (3) (1957).
49. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1 (d) (3), (4), (5) ex. (1) & (2) (1957).
50. The amount is ascertainable if a total sum is stated or can be computed. Warnack v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 541 (1979); cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1 (d) (3) (ii) (b), 1 (d) (5) ex. (3) (1957). But see
Myers v. Commissioner, 212 F.2d 448 (9th Cir. 1954).
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holds-death, remarriage, loss of employment, impoverishment or other
contingencies which affect ability to pay or need-one is nearly compelled to conclude that the wife's award is an agreed-upon share of present marital wealth. Husbands cannot agree to, wives cannot reasonably
expect and courts generally do not demand, a no-strings obligation which
present marital wealth cannot adequately finance. The attachment of income-sensitive strings to the husband's obligation suggests that he will
look to future income to meet it. Section 71(c)(2), 5 1 which treats install-ment payments of a fixed sum as periodic, is not inconsistent with this
perception. Rather, it reflects a presumption, or at least a compromise
based on suspicion, that payments stretching over ten years are more
likely to come from income than capital.
Admittedly, this analysis is not perfect. For example, remarriage of the
wife may affect her need for continued support, but has nothing to do
with the husband's income. Nevertheless, viewing the periodic requirement as a guardian of the income-splitting policy is the most plausible
52
explanation for its existence.
Perhaps divining a grand purpose behind sections 71 and 215 attributes
false intent to Congress. But in view of the stated purpose to tax income
to the receiving spouse, one has difficulty believing Congress was desultory in selecting the statutory language. And if the objective of this regime is to achieve income splitting, with minimal dependence on state
law, its focus has been blurred through gradual subjugation to the techni53
calities of section 71, particularly the support requirement.
TREATMENT OF PROPERTY TRANSFERS
Two early decisions of the Board of Tax Appeals held that a husband
does not realize taxable gain on the transfer of appreciated property to his
wife as part of a divorce settlement. 54 In each case the wife accepted securities in complete discharge of her right to support and whatever rights
she may have had in the husband's property. The decisions rested on alternative grounds: one, that rights released by the wife could not be
valued; and two, that the transfer was a nontaxable division of'property.
51. I.R.C. §71 (c) (2), text quoted at note 30 supra.
52. Note, Alimony Taxation-The Contingency Doctrine Challenged, 9 HARV. J. LEGiS. 156,
160 (1971). One writer suggests that the periodic requirement properly prevents the bunching of
income and deductions to the wife and husband, respectively, that would obtain if § 71 did not require periodic payments. Peschel, supranote 38, at 227. See note 33 supra.
53. See text accompanying notes 98-105 and 109-15 infra.
54. Halliwell v. Commissoner, 44 B.T.A. 740 (1941), rev'dper curiam, 131 F.2d 642 (2d Cir.
1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 741 (1943); Mesta v. Commissioner, 42 B.T.A. 933 (1940), rev'd,
123 F.2d 986 (3d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 695 (1942).

227

Washington Law Review

Vol. 56:217, 1981

Both cases were reversed. In Commissioner v. Mesta,55 the Third Circuit
likened the transfer to an appropriation by the husband of the gain inherent in the securities, and peremptorily rejected the division of property
argument. The Second Circuit followed suit in Commissioner v. Halliwell. 56 Neither opinion analyzed in any detail the precise nature of the
57
rights surrendered by the wife.
For the next twenty years the rule was settled that when a husband
transferred appreciated property to his wife to satisfy his support obligation, he realized a taxable gain measured by the excess of the value of the
property over his basis in the property. 58 Then the Sixth Circuit rejected
the notion that the rights surrendered by the wife can be presumed equal
in value to the property transferred by the husband. 59 The Court of Claims
did the same shortly afterward, prompting review by the Supreme Court
in United States v. Davis.60
In Davis, the husband agreed to make monthly support payments and
also transferred appreciated securities to obtain the release of whatever
rights Mrs. Davis had arising out of the marital relationship. Against the
government's assertion that he realized a gain on the transfer, Mr. Davis
countered that the transfer was a nontaxable division of property, and alternatively, that even if the transfer was taxable, his gain could not be
measured. On the second point, the Court reversed, holding that the
rights surrendered by Mrs. Davis must be presumed equal in value to the
securities. 6 1 Before reaching that issue, however, the Court had to find
that the transfer was a taxable event.
55. 123 F.2d 986 (3d Cir. 1941). The court relied on Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940),
which held that a taxpayer who owned bonds, and had given only the interest coupons to his son,
realized the benefit of the interest, and therefore was taxable on the interest, even though it was paid
directly to his son. See notes 21 & 22 supra. On the valuation question, the court equated the value of
the rights released by the wife with the value of the securities she received.
56. 131 F.2d642(2dCir. 1942).
57. In response to the taxpayer's attempt in Halliwell to distinguish Mesta. the Second Circuit
observed that Mrs. Halliwell had no present property rights in the securities under Connecticut law.
rather that she accepted the securities in lieu of support. 131 F.2d at 643.
58. E.g., Marshman v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 269 (1958), rev'd, 279 F.2d 27(6th Cir.). cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 918 (1960); King v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 108 (1958); Estate of Stouffer v.
Commissioner, 30 T.C. 1244 (1958), rev'd sub norn., Commissioner v. Marshman, 279 F.2d 27
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 918 (1960); Patino v. Commissioner, 13 T.C. 816 (1949), aff'd.
186 F.2d 962 (4th Cir. 1950); Hall v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 53 (1947). If the parties assigned a value
to the property in the divorce negotiations, that value was used to measure the husband's gain. Estate
of Stouffer, supra;Patino, supra;Hall, supra.
59. Commissioner v. Marshman, 279 F.2d 27 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 918 (1960).
60. United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962), rev'g, 287 F.2d 168 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
61. Id. at 72. The Court also stated in dictum that the value of the securities determined the
wife's basis in them. Id. at 73. The Tax Court had held the same previously in Marshman v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 269 (1958), rev'd, 279 F.2d 27 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 918 (1960): accord, Rev. Rul. 67-221, 1967-2 C.B. 63 (also confirming that the wife does not realize income in a
Davis transaction).
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When co-owners of property partition their interests, neither realizes a
gain for tax purposes and the basis in the property remains the same (part
of it carries over to each party). Mr. Davis equated that situation with the
transfer of securities to his wife, which demanded the premise that she
was a co-owner. The Court rejected that premise:
The taxpayer's analogy, however, stumbles on its own premise, for the inchoate rights granted a wife in her husband's property by the Delaware law
do not even remotely reach the dignity of co-ownership ...
This is not to say it would be completely illogical to consider the shearing
off of the wife's rights in her husband's property as a division of that property, but we believe the contrary to be the more reasonable construction.
Regardless of the tags, Delaware seems only to place a burden on the husband's property rather than to make the wife a part owner thereof. In the
present context the rights of succession and reasonable share do not differ
significantly from the husband's obligations of support and alimony. They
all partake more of a personal liability of the husband than a property interest of the wife. The effectuation of these marital rights may ultimately result
in the ownership of some of the husband's property as it did here, but certainly this happenstance does not equate the transaction with a division of
62
property by co-owners.
Instead of merely relinquishing to Mrs. Davis her property, Mr. Davis
used his property to satisfy his support obligation. Once that premise is
met, taxing the husband is in accord with the principle that satisfaction of
an obligation with appreciated property results in a taxable gain. 63
Thus the treatment of property transfers incident to divorce turns on the
nature of the wife's marital rights under state law. Under Delaware law
Mrs. Davis was entitled upon divorce to whatever share of her husband's
property the divorce court deemed reasonable. 64 Similar statutes are in
force in other states, yet in some cases wives whose substantive property
rights seem indistinguishable from Mrs. Davis' have been treated as coowners. 65 As in the treatment of periodic alimony payments, the distinction between support rights and property rights plays a predominant role
in the treatment of one-time property transfers incident to divorce.

62. 370 U.S. at 70-71. The specific provisions which the Court was construing are I.R.C. §§
61(a) and 1001, which subject to taxation "gains derived from dealings in property" and measure
them by the excess of the fair market value of property received (release of the wife's marital rights)
over the adjusted basis of the property disposed of (the securities).
63. See Kenan v. Commissioner, 114 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1940).
64. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1531 (1953) (current version at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1527
(1974)).

65.

See text accompanying notes 73-95 infra.
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ASSESSMENT OF THE NEED FOR REFORM
A system of taxation of transfers incident to divorce-periodic alimony payments and one-time conveyances of property-should have
among its goals certainty, uniformity and simplicity. The government's
position is close to a stakeholder; aside from differences in timing and
rates, a tax benefit to the husband is usually matched by a countervailing
tax cost to the wife, and vice versa. Given this neutrality (at least theoretically), 66 strict adherence to analogical reasoning can be relaxed to attain
desirable goals so long as the results are generally acceptable. Consideration will now be given to various aspects of the present system which
frustrate these goals.
Support versus PropertyRights-in General
As discussed earlier, whether a transfer of wealth discharges the wife's
right to support, as opposed to satisfying her property rights, determines
the consequences of periodic payments and one-time property transfers.
To recapitulate somewhat simplistically, the basic purpose of the distinction between support and property rights is to separate situations where
the husband is either deflecting income (periodic alimony payments) or
using previously untaxed gain to satisfy an obligation (Davis), from situations where husband and wife are dividing their property. The former produce tax consequences; the latter do not.
If the distinction is clear, the results are certain. For example, suppose
that husband and wife own no property when they marry. During the marriage each is employed outside the home and earns equal compensation.
All their earnings are invested in a single parcel of real estate, which they
hold as tenants in common. There is no other present marital wealth.
When they divorce, he takes half the parcel and she takes the other half.
In addition, the husband agrees to pay five hundred dollars a month alimony until the wife remarries. The law of their state gives the wife a right
to support, but does not give either spouse a right upon divorce to a share
66. The spouse who deducts alimony is not required to identify the recipient on his or her tax
return, nor presumably to file an information return describing the payments. See I.R.C. § 6041(aJ.
The temptation to overstate alimony deductions and understate alimony income is undeniable. See
Kuntz, Simplification of the Definition ofPeriodic Payments in Internal Revenue Code Section 71, 47
CIN. L. REV. 213, 220 (1978); STATISTICS OF INCOME, supra note 10, at 22, 55. Also. there is a
suspicion of substantial noncompliance with Davis. PERSONAL INCOME COMMITTEE, TAX SECTION.
NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION,

REPORT ON THE DAVIS RULE REGARDING PROPERTY SETTLE-

MENTS IN DIVORCE OR SEPARATION (June 1978). See, e.g.. Spruance v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 141
(1973), aff'd mem., 505 F.2d 731 (3d Cir. 1974) (trust for wife's benefit obtained stepped-up fair
market value basis despite fact that husband's failure to report gain on transfer was barred by statute
of limitations).
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of the other's property. The splitting of real estate is a nontaxable division
of property and the monthly payments are deductible to the husband and
income to the wife.
But rarely are the facts so easy. Spouses may bring unequal wealth to
the marriage. They may contribute in different amounts and different
ways to marital wealth during marriage. Title ownership of property may
not exist or may bear no relationship to actual contribution. State laws
may confer equal property rights or give courts the power to shuffle property between spouses depending upon what is reasonable, what the wife
needs, what the husband is able to give, relative contributions, the
grounds for divorce or various combinations of the foregoing. State
courts may vary in their interpretation of such laws. The divorce papers
may be ambiguous as to the legal nature of a particular transfer. Consequently, the distinction between support and property rights can be hope67
lessly muddled, resulting in an unwarranted amount of litigation.
Moreover, in the difficult cases, one must strain to find any real content in
the distinction.
When defining a payment in the nature of support, one thinks of the
principal historical function of alimony, to maintain the approximate
standard of living which the wife enjoyed during marriage. 68 But courts
also use alimony to achieve other purposes, such as supporting children
and penalizing fault. 69 And in determining alimony, they use some criteria which are not necessarily related to support. 70 The realm of factors
includes the husband's ability to pay, the wife's needs, who is at fault, the
age and health of the parties, how much property they own and whether
the wife contributed to its accumulation, the length of the marriage and
71
the parties' other financial responsibilities.
In the abstract, most of these factors are sufficiently related to the notion of marital support to provide a workable basis for distinguishing a
division of property. But if the wife's "property" is not clearly earmarked by record ownership, community property laws or other means,
how is it to be defined? The distinction from support would remain acceptably clear if in defining property rights, courts confined themselves to
factors bearing on equitable ownership, such as how the property was
originally acquired, how it was used and who supplied the purchase
67. The following is from a recent report on the Tax Court's overload: "Divorce issues also crop
up with numbing regularity. Alimony payments normally are deductible by the payer and taxable to
the recipient, and the judges often have to decide whether payments are alimony or part of a property
settlement and thus nondeductible." Wall St. J., April 14, 1980, at 37, col. 3.
68. See H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS, §§ 14.1, 14.5, at 441-42 (1968).
69. Id.§§ 14.1,at421-22, 14.5, at441.
70. Id. § 14.5, at441.
71. Id. § 14.5, at443-47.
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money. However, courts do not so confine themselves, and instead resort
to the same factors that are relevant to setting alimony. 72 The resulting
overlap clouds the distinction between support and property rights, and in
the process causes unwarranted uncertainty and arbitrariness in tax consequences. The Tenth Circuit's applications of Davis illustrate.
Support versus PropertyRights-One-Time Transfers

In Pulliam v. Commissoner,73 the wife had entered the marriage with
no property and had not worked outside the home. The husband transferred real estate to her pursuant to a court-ordered property settlement.
The settlement took into account several factors, including the financial
condition of the parties, the husband's support duty and earning capacity,
and whether the wife brought any property into the marriage. 74 With little
analysis, the court concluded that Colorado law did not confer on the wife
rights of ownership in her husband's property and held the transfer was
taxable under Davis.
In Collins v. Commissioner,75 the wife brought relatively little property
to the marriage, but had assisted her husband in entertaining business associates during the marriage. Under the property settlement agreement,
she received substantial monthly alimony payments and stock in a family
business which the husband had inherited. 76 The award took into account
the length of the marriage, the wife's accustomed standard of living, her
72. Id. § 14.8, at 450-51. Factors bearing on equitable ownership, particularly the wife's contribution to the accumulation of marital wealth, relate more logically to property fights than to support.
But the courts refer to such factors for either purpose. See text accompanying note 71 supra.
73. 329 F.2d 97(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 836(1964).
74. The court was empowered to decree the settlement under COLO. REV. STAT. § 46-1-5 (1953)
(current version at COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-113 (1973)), which stated simply that the court "'may
decree a division of property."
75. 388 F.2d 353 (10th Cir. 1968), aff'g, 46T.C. 461 (1966).
76. The statutory authority for the settlement is as follows:
When a divorce shall be granted by reason of the fault or aggression of the husband, the wife
shall be restored to her maiden name if she so desires, and also to all the property, lands, tenements, hereditaments owned by her before marriage or acquired by her in her own fight after
such marriage, and not previously disposed of, and shall be allowed such alimony out of the
husband's real and personal property as the court shall think reasonable, having due regard to the
value of his real and personal estate at the time of said divorce; which alimony may be allowed
to her in real or personal property, or both, or by decreeing to her such sum of money, payable
either in gross or in installments, as the court may deem just and equitable. As to such property,
whether real or personal, as shall have been acquired by the parties jointly during their marriage,
whether the title thereto be in either or both of said parties, the court shall make such division
between the parties respectively as may appear just and reasonable, by a division of the property
in kind, or by setting the same apart to one of the parties, and requiring the other thereof to pay
such sum as may be just and proper to effect a fair and just division thereof.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1278 (West 1961) (current version at OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12. § 1278
(West Supp. 1980)).

232

Divorce Wealth-Transfers
contribution to the success of the business and the husband's
wherewithal. The court reviewed Oklahoma law, finding that the authority for such settlements considered the wife's needs as well as attributes
of equitable ownership, and ultimately concluded that Mrs. Collins possessed no such property fights that would preclude application of Davis.
The same issue arose with respect to the husband's state income tax liability. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma decided that Mrs. Collins did in fact
have a vested right in her husband's property under Oklahoma law, and
therefore that Davis was distinguishable. 77 The United States Supreme
Court then vacated and remanded the Tenth Circuit's decision for recon79
sideration 78 and Mr. Collins ultimately prevailed.
Next came Wiles v. Commissioner.80 There, pursuant to a property settlement agreement, the wife retained her separately owned property and
also received $550,000 worth of securities owned by her husband to effect an equal split of the total marital wealth. 8' The facts stated cryptically
that the marital wealth included "substantial assets which were either
brought into their marriage or acquired by their joint efforts.' '82 No alimony payments were provided. The court observed that under Kansas
law, a wife's rights upon divorce in her husband's property depend on the
source of the property, relative contributions, earning capacity, fault,
needs, ages and length of marriage. It held that Kansas wives are not
vested co-owners of their husbands' property and applied Davis.
Finally there is Imel v. United States.8 3 The wife had materially contributed to the success of various family businesses and investments, most
of which were owned by the husband. The property settlement gave her a
half interest in these properties (stocks, real estate and equipment), represented by a fifty percent stock interest in certain corporations. No provision was made for alimony. After reviewing Pulliam, Collins, and Wiles,
the district court admitted difficulty in defining the exact nature of Mrs.
Imel's interest under Colorado law, but opined that it was similar to the
77. Collins v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 446 P.2d 290 (Okla. 1968).
78. Collins v. Commissioner, 393 U.S. 215 (1968).
79. Collins v. Commissioner, 412 F.2d 211 (10th Cir. 1969).
80. 499 F.2d 255 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 996 (1974) (affirming 60 T.C. 56 (1973)).
81. Authority for the property settlement is as follows:
The decree shall divide the real and personal property of the parties, whether owned by either
spouse prior to marriage, acquired by either spouse in his or her own right after marriage, or
acquired by their joint efforts, in a just and reasonable manner, either by a division of the prop-

erty in kind, or by setting the same or a part thereof over to one of the spouses and requiring
either to pay such sum as may be just and proper, or by ordering a sale of the same under such
conditions as the court may prescribe and dividing the proceeds of such sale.
KAN.STAT. ANN. § 60-1610 (b) (1971) (current version at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610 (c) (Supp.

1979)).
82.
83.

60T.C. at 56,57(1973).
523 F.2d 853(10th Cir. 1975).
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"species of common ownership" under Oklahoma law recognized by the
Tenth Circuit in Collins.84 To remove doubt, it certified the issue to the
Colorado Supreme Court. That court interpreted Colorado law 85 as giving
the wife a species of common ownership in her husband's property which
vested upon the filing of the divorce action. 86 The district court then held
87
for Mr. Imel and was affirmed by the Tenth Circuit.
These cases, and others, involving the judiciary's travails since Davis
with the distinction between support and property rights are analyzed
elsewhere. 88 They are raised here merely to illustrate the welter which the
84. 375F. Supp. 1102, 1113 (D. Colo. 1973).
85.
'[T~he court may make such orders, if any, as the circumstances of the case may warrant
relative to division of property, in such proportions as may be fair and equitable." COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 46-1-5 (1963) (current version at COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-1 13 (1973)). The text had changed
since Pulliam. Compare note 74 supra. The current version reads as follows:
Disposition of property. (1) In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or for legal separation or
a proceeding for disposition of property following dissolution of marriage by a court which
lacked personal jurisdicion over the absent spouse or lacked jurisdiction to dispose of the property, the court shall set apart to each spouse his property and shall divide the marital property,
without regard to marital misconduct, in such proportions as the court deems just after considering all relevant factors including:
(a) The contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the marital property, including the
contribution of a spouse as homemaker;
(b) The value of the property set apart to each spouse;
(c) The economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the division of property is to become
effective, including the desirability of awarding the family home or the right to live therein for
reasonable periods to the spouse having custody of any children; and
(d) Any increases or decreases in the value of the separate property of the spouse during the
marriage or the depletion of the separate property for marital purposes.
(2) For purposes of this article only, "marital property" means all property acquired by either
spouse subsequent to the marriage except:
(a) Property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or descent;
(b) Property acquired in exchange for property acquired prior to the marriage or in exchange for
property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or descent;
(c) Property acquired by a spouse after a decree of legal separation; and
(d) Property excluded by valid agreement of the parties.
(3) All property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage and prior to a decree of
legal separation is presumed to be marital property, regardless of whether title is held individually or by the spouses in some form of co-ownership such as joint tenancy, tenancy in common,
tenancy by the entirety, and community property. The presumption of marital property is overcome by a showing that the property was acquired by a method listed in subsection (2) of this
section.
(4) An asset of a spouse acquired prior to the marriage or in accordance with subsection (2)(a) or
(2)(b) of this section shall be considered as marital property, for purposes of this article only, to
the extent that its present value exceeds its value at the time of the marriage or at the time of
acquisition ifacquired after the marriage.
COLO.REV. STAT. § 14-10-113 (1973).
86. In re Questions Submitted by United States Dist. Ct., 517 P.2d 1331 (Colo. 1974).
87. Imel v. United States, 375 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Colo. 1974) (supplemental opinion), affd, 523
F.2d 853 (10th Cir. 1975).
88. See, e.g., Note, The FederalIncome Tax Consequences of Propert' Settlements in Common
Law States and Under the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act: A Proposal. 29 ME. L. REV. 73

Divorce Wealth Transfers
decision making has fallen into. In Pulliam, the wife did not contribute
significantly to the accumulation of marital wealth, nor did she receive
alimony. Thus it seems reasonable to regard her receipt of the husband's
property as performing a support function. In Collins and Imel, the wives
did assist their husbands' business activities, which lends credence to the
notion that their receipt of property was some kind of a division of equitable ownership. Mrs. Collins' additional receipt of substantial" alimony
payments buttresses that view. But Mrs. Imel did not receive alimony.
Was she therefore unentitled to support, or did her substantial "property"
rights simply remove her need for support? Present Colorado law compels
its courts to consider the wife's economic circumstances in determining
her share of the marital property and allows alimony only if the property
is insufficient to meet her needs. 89 But the amount of the property division is within the court's discretion, 90 which in reality permits the court to
secure the wife's support either through the husband's property or
through alimony. 9 1
The wife in Wiles apparently owned substantial assets before marriage
and played some role in the accumulation of marital wealth. 92 Like Mrs.
Imel, she was not awarded alimony. Yet despite the general similarity of
the Kansas and Colorado statutes, 93 her receipt of over one half million
dollars of her husband's property was deemed akin to support. Aside
from the difficulty of reconciling Wiles-and Imel, it seems unreasonable
that a woman of apparent business acumen, and already possessed of substantial property of her own, needed such a large share of her husband's
property solely to assure her support. Unreasonable, that is, unless the
notion of support embraces some of the considerations which relate niore
logically to equitable property rights. Once again the distinction is
blurred.
(1977); Note, Should FederalIncome Tax Consequencesof DivorceDepend on State PropertyLaw?,
49 So. CAL. L. REv. 1401 (1976). For an exhaustive list of citations to commentary on Davis and its
implications, see id. at 1405-07. Recent applications of Davis are in Bosch v. United States, 590
F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1979) (Davis distinguished where wife's interest in husband's real estate represented her "special equity" under Florida law); Forbes v. United States, 472 F. Supp. 840 (D. Mass.
1979) (Davis applied where wife's interest in residence held as tenancy by entireties did not rise to
dignity of property rights under Massachusetts law).
89. Compare COLO. REv. STAT. § 14-10-113 (1973), quoted note 85 supra, with COLO. REV.
STAT. § 14-10-114 (1973).
90. COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-113 (1973), quoted note 85 supra, calling for a division "in
such proportions as the court deems just." See, e.g., In re Graham, 574 P.2d 75 (Colo. 1978).
91. The Colorado Supreme Court must have been concerned about this, for it specifically pointed
out that Mrs. Imel's waiver of alimony was unrelated to the property settlement, and not to be regarded as consideration for the settlement. In re Questions Submitted by United States Dist. Ct.,
517 P.2d 1331, 1335-36 (Colo. 1974). In view of the realities of negotiations between the parties,
the court's statement strains credulity.
92. See text accompanying note 82 supra.
93. Compare notes 81 & 85 supra.
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These decisions, and the state law they apply, demonstrate that in arriving at a settlement of marital wealth, the parties and the divorce court
will not close their eyes to any factor that militates in favor of financial
relief for the wife. The settlement, whatever form it takes, reflects an
amalgam of considerations that frequently do not fall nicely on either side
of a line separating support rights and property rights. Yet for tax pur94
poses, the federal courts are forced to draw the line and pick a side.
The discriminating effect of state law is magnified when state courts
are called upon to decide issues which render the determination of federal
tax consequences little more than a ministerial act. State court pronouncements in Collins and Ime195 that the wife's interest in her husband's property vested upon divorce as a species of common ownership seemingly
affected nothing but tax consequences. 96 Characterization of the wife's
undisputed right as a property interest merely pinned on a label that neatly
avoided unfavorable tax consequences to the husband. Deferring to state
government the ultimate power to determine the federal income tax consequences to its residents, through action which doesn't otherwise alter
97
their substantive rights and duties, is an undesirable practice.
It may seem that discussing the applicability of Davis in terms of
94. A few cases divide recurring cash payments into two components, one attributable to support
and the other to property rights. See, e.g., Hayutin v. Commissioner, 508 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1974);
Bishop v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 720 (1971), acq., 1971-2 C.B. 1.
95. Collins v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 446 P.2d 290 (Okla. 1968); In re Questions Submitted
by United States Dist. Ct., 517 P.2d 1331 (Colo. 1974). These determinations of the rights of
parties under state law are binding on the federal courts for tax purposes. Commissioner v. Estate of
Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967) (decision of highest state court is conclusive, lower state court decisions
given proper regard). See generally Note, 29 ME. L. REV. 73, 95-103 (1977).
96. In Imel, the state court was careful to point out that its decision placed no new burdens on the
husband's property except for those which vest upon the filing of a divorce action. In re Questions
Submitted by United States Dist. Ct., 517 P.2d 1331, 1334-35 (Colo. 1974). The state court in
Collins went beyond, stating that the wife's interest in marital property may be exercised at any time
during the marriage, irrespective of divorce. Collins v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 446 P.2d 290, 297
(Okla. 1968). However, in Sanditen v. Sanditen, 496 P.2d 365 (Okla. 1972), the Oklahoma Supreme
Court backed away from this language, holding that the property rights adjudicated in Collins vested
only by reason of the divorce action.
Characterization of the wife's interest as a property ight, as opposed to alimony, does eliminate
certain methods of enforcing compliance and judicial power to modify the award if future circumstances warrant-features that do not apply to a division of property. But the loss of these rights is
insignificant in the context of one-time transfers; there is no future compliance to enforce, and lump
sum alimony (whether payable at once or in installments) is not modifiable in any event. See H.
CLARK, supra note 68, §§ 14.8, at 449, 14.9, at 455. Characterization of periodic payments as a
property division may, however, result in the loss of otherwise available enforcement procedures.
See id. § 14.8, at 449. But that change alone falls short ofjustifying different tax consequences.
97. The government's position which was rejected in Imel was that a question of federal taxation
was improperly deferred to the Supreme Court of Colorado. Imel v. United States, 523 F.2d 853, 855
(10th Cir. 1975). Often, however, state income tax liability is also involved. E.g., Collins v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 446 P.2d 290 (Okla. 1968).
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whether the wife's receipt is an extraction of her property or, conversely,
in the nature of support misses the point; that Davis distinguished property divisions, not from transfers in the nature of support, but rather from
compensation for the wife's inchoate property. But that is overanalysis.
The language in Davis evinces an understanding that the inchoate rights
conferred upon wives by Delaware law were not meaningfully different
from the right to support. 98 Even conceding a technical distinction under
state law, the holding in Davis demonstrates the irrelevance of such a
distinction to federal income tax consequences. The fundamental issue in
cases like Davis is simply whether the wife's rights in the wealth she
receives incident to divorce are the equivalent of property rights under
state law. If they are, a nontaxable division of property has occurred. If
they are not, the husband has transferred his property to satisfy an obligation, whih is a taxable event. For federal income tax purposes, which of
these two situations obtains is the only point of identifying the nature of
the wife's rights under state law. Further subcategorization of nonproperty rights is uncalled for by Davis, and produces needless confusion.
The nomenclature used in this article-support-versus-property rightswas chosen not to show that such a formula produces rational results (indeed, quite the contrary), but rather to emphasize that deciding a case like
Davis should involve the same methodology as deciding whether recurring cash payments are taxable to the husband or to the wife. The only
real difference is in the form and timing of the wealth transfer.
Supportversus PropertyRights-PeriodicPayments
Section 71 applies only to periodic payments in the nature of support,
not to extractions by the wife of her property. 99 Where clear evidence of
property rights, such as record ownership or community property, is not
present, analysis of whether a payment is for support should focus on the
nature of the wife's rights under state law-the same analysis used in
cases like Davis.lo0 If state law does not give the wife property rights, by
98. See the quotation in the text accompanying note 62 supra. Mrs. Davis' inchoate rights were
dower (only in real estate), intestate succession and a reasonable share of her husband's property
upon divorce. See Davis, 370 U.S. at 66.
99. See text accompanying notes 39-41 supra.
100. Four recent decisions adopt this approach. Mann v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. No. 92 (1980),
held that a wife who materially contributed to the success of her husband's business acquired a "special equity" in his property under Florida law. Thus the husband's payment of $150,000 in annual
installments of $7,500 (periodic under § 71(c)(2)) was not deductible. In Gammill v. Commissioner,
73 T.C. 921 (1980), the wife, who contributed to the marriage only as a homemaker, acquired a
"species of common ownership" in her husband's property under Oklahoma law. Her receipt of
$250,000 in annual installments of $12,500 (periodic under § 71(c)(2)) was, therefore, neither income to her nor deductible by him. Annual payments of $4,000 (periodic under § 71(c)(2)) that were

Washington Law Review

Vol. 56:217, 1981

process of elimination the conclusion that payments are for support seems
logically inescapable, and vice versa. Nonetheless, several cases have ignored state law, 101 looking instead to the surrounding facts and circumstances to determine whether the payments are for support. 102 Factors indicative of a property settlement include the absence of contingencies, the

labeled "alimony" were treated as part of a property settlement in Widmer v. Commissioner, 75
T.C. No. 35 (1980), because under Indiana law alimony can be used to achieve support, a property
settlement, or both. The court was persuaded from the facts and circumstances that the parties had
intended to effect only a property settlement. Schottenstein v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. No. 39
(1980), is the most striking example of this approach, and persuasive evidence that the operation of
the support-versus-property distinction is sorely lacking in consistency and clarity. Annual payments
of $12,000 (periodic under § 71(c)(2)) were taxable to the wife because she had no property rights
under Ohio law, despite the fact that the court was convinced that the parties intended the payments to
be a property settlement. Compare this result with the text accompanying notes 101 -03 infra.
101. Some cases point to the legislative history of the Revenue Act of 1942 (see text accompanying notes 25-27 supra) to justify resolving § 71's support issue without regard to state law. Bernatschke v. United States, 364 F.2d 400, 408 n.9 (Ct. Cl. 1966); Taylor v. Campbell, 335 F.2d 84 1,
845-46 (5th Cir. 1964); Bardwell v. Commissioner, 318 F.2d 786, 789 (10th Cir. 1963); Bishop v.
Commissioner, 55 T.C. 720 (1971). Contra, Hayutin v. Commissioner, 508 F.2d 462 (10th Cir.
1974); Mills v. Commissioner, 442 F.2d 1149 (10th Cir. 1971); Mann v. Commissioner, 74 T.C.
No. 92 (1980); Gammill v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 921 (1980); Widmer v. Commissioner, 75 T.C.
No. 35 (1980). The effort to give § 71 national consistency is laudable. But so long as it depends on
the marital obligation of support, which undeniably is a creature of state law, ignoring state law by
fiat just adds to the confusion. Moreover, congressional dissatisfaction in 1942 with the effect of
varying standards under state law on the tax treatment of alimony concerned whether the husband's
support duty survived divorce, not the definition of support. These issues are related, see text accompanying note 28 supra, but not exactly the same.
The Tenth Circuit's decisions in this area are reminiscent of its applications of Davis. Compare
Mills v. Commissioner, 442 F.2d 1149 (10th Cir. 1971) (periodic cash payments to the wife, who
had contributed to the accumulation of marital wealth, were treated as a division of property under
Oklahoma law), with Hayutin v. Commissioner, 508 F.2d 452 (10th Cir. 1974) (periodic payments
to the wife, who also made some contribution, were treated as support under Colorado law (except to
the extent attributable to property of which the wife was record owner)). In Mills, the court relied on
Collins v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 446 P.2d 290 (Okla. 1968). whereas in Hayut in, it followed state
law, but dismissed In Re Questions Submitted by United States Dist. Ct., 517 P.2d 1331 (Colo.
1974), as not controlling. See notes 77, 86 & 95 and accompanying text supra.
102. Lambros v. Commissioner, 459 F.2d 69 (6th Cir. 1972), aff'g, 30 T.C.M. 585 (1971). is a
good example. The wife had worked with her husband during the early years of her marriage. Total
marital wealth was valued at $312,000 at the time of divorce, most of which appeared to be owned by
the husband. The divorce court ordered that $150,000 be paid to the wife as an "equitable distribution of property," of which $100.000 took the form of periodic cash payments. Against the husband's claim that the periodic payments were deductible under I.R.C. § 215, it was held that the
payments were part of a property settlement and not support. The opinions did not analyze Ohio law.
which allows such alimony as the divorce court deems reasonable, payable either in money or property, taking into account a list of factors, some of which sound of support and some equitable ownership. OHio REV. CODE ANN. (Page) § 3105.18 (1980). Ohio law does not elsewhere authorize a
division of property. The Sixth Circuit relied on the lack of reference in the divorce decree to the
husband's ability to pay or the wife's needs. But it's a long leap from there to the finding that the wife
owned rights in her husband's property, especially in view of the Ohio statute. Cf. Schottenstein v.
Commissioner, 75 T.C. No. 39 (1980) (discussed at note 100 supra).
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presence of other contingent payments, lack of need and the parties' in-

tent. 103
The anomaly is that the definition of support has no content without
reference to the state law which creates it, and which distinguishes it from
rights of ownership in property. Regardless of whether the search is for
support or for property, proper analysis inevitably leads to an examination of state property law. State laws on this subject are vague enough in
themselves. 104 So long as section 71 retains the support requirement, sporadic acceptance of a federal standard of support will only add another
layer of uncertainty. Notwithstanding the firmness of conviction found in
some judicial opinions, what is often portrayed as a well ordered universe
consisting of two clearly marked territories in reality can be overlapping
provinces of uncertain borders-the same confused state of affairs that
attends resolution of cases like Davis. That probably explains the increasing tendency of courts to characterize recurring payments in a manner that
05
produces the tax results which the parties mutually intended. 1
103. The realm of factors bearing on the support-versus-property issue in the context of periodic
payments are analyzed in Harris, supranote 42, at 60-79.
104. An example of the chameleonic nature of state law characterizations of a wife's rights is in
this quotation of Indiana law from Widmer v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. No. 35 (1980) (discussed at
note 100 supra):
Alimony is awarded in Indiana for the purpose of making a present and complete settlement of
the property rights of the parties. It does not include future support for the wife, nor is it intended as a medium for financial compensation for injured sensitivities during marriage. The
primary factor in fixing the alimony is the existing property of the parties. However, other facts
which the court may consider are the source of the property, the income of the parties and the
nature of the abuse inflicted upon the wife,-particularly if that abuse affected the earning capacity of the wife and would have been a basis for an action in damages except for the fact of the
marriage. Shula v. Shula, 235 Ind. 210, 214-15, 132 N.E.2d 612, 614 (1956) (emphasis added).
105. Warnack v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 541 (1979), illustrates this tendency. In their agreement, the parties, both of whom were represented by counsel, placed values on their community
property which aggregated $790,000. The wife received property worth only $140,000 on the basis
of these values, but received periodic cash payments totalling $257,000 to make up the difference.
Although the parties provided in their agreement that the husband would deduct and the wife would
include such payments in income, she reneged, maintaining that the payments represented the balance of her interest in the community property. The court was persuaded by testimony that despite the
agreed-upon values, stock in a certain corporation that the husband retained and that had been valued
at $276,000 was actually worth minus $369,000. Acceptance of this testimony permitted a finding
that the wife received at least her half of the community property and, therefore, that by process of
elimination the periodic payments must have been for support. The court's willingness to believe that
the parties erred by such a huge margin in valuing this stock was largely attributable to its desire to
make the wife live up to the tax consequences she negotiated. But cf. Schottenstein v. Commissioner,
75 T.C. No. 39 (1980) (discussed at note 100 supra).
Throughout the income tax treatment of transfers incident to divorce lies evidence that Congress
intended to give spouses the power to eliminate uncertainty by allocating the tax burden between
themselves by agreement. See I.R.C. § 152(e) (2) (spouses can choose who is entitled to dependency
exemption for children); I.R.C. § 71 (b) and Commissioner v. Lester, 366 U.S. 299 (1961) (allowing
spouses to decide who is taxable on child support). See also Gammill v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 921
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In conclusion, the problems engendered by attempting to distinguish
support and property rights are ubiquitous. Statutes authorizing an equita06
ble division of the husband's property are in force nearly everywhere. 1
The same is true of alimony. 107 These problems might be tolerable if the
distinction served an important policy. But it doesn't. Rather, it emanates
from general rules of taxation' 0 8 which, though justifiable generally, do
not further a purpose worthy of the unavoidable confusion they cause in
the treatment of wealth transfers incident to divorce. Acceptable results
can be achieved by other means.
PeriodicPayments
Discussion above explains section 71 's requirement of periodic payments as an attempt to confine the shifting of income tax liability from
husband to wife to situations where income is actually shifted. 1 9 Payments that satisfy the periodic requirement are usually of an indeterminable total amount, 1 0 and in that sense are akin to support payments,
which in theory vary in amount with the economic status of the parties at
any particular time. The contingencies which make a payment periodicdeath, remarriage or change in economic status-also indicate that it is in
the nature of support. "'1
Two observations come to mind. If the periodic requirement significantly duplicates the support requirement, why is it necessary? 122 And if
(1980), where in rejecting the husband's argument that §483 applied to periodic payments found to be
part of a property settlement, the court cited Lester for the broad proposition that "parties to the
divorce agreement may for tax purposes act as their best interest dictates." This notion of elective tax
treatment may make sense in a particular case, but an overly tolerant judicial attitude toward the
requirements of § 71 tends to confuse their application in other cases.
106. One source reported that all but seven common law states have "equitable division" statutes, those which give one spouse a claim against the other's property in a divorce action. National
Law Journal, Feb. 25, 1980, at 7, col. 1. A catalogue of the statutes appears in Note, 49 So. CAL. L.
REv. 1401, 1419-23(1976).
107. Only four states do not have alimony statutes. H. CLARK, supra note 68, § 14.1, at 421
n.12.
108. See text accompanying notes 18, 42-44 and 63 supra.
109. See text accompanying notes 50-52 supra.
110. See text accompanying notes 49-50 supra.
11I. See Warnack v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 541, 550 (1979) (stating that payments in the nature of support are "probably periodic"); e.g., Lambros v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. 585, 587-88
(1971), aff'd, 459 F.2d 69 (6th Cir. 1972) (pointing to absence of death orremarriage contingency as
one of the "earmarks of an out-and-out division of property"); Bematschke v. United States, 364
F.2d 400 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
112. The duplication is built into Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1 (d) (3) (1957), which in defining "periodic" with respect to payments which terminate less than 10 years after the divorce requires that they
be in the nature of support. Examples of a finding that payments that are part of a property settlement
destroy the periodicity requirement as well as the independent support requirement are Crouser v.
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its main function is to assure income splitting, why choose so indirect a
device? The naked fact that a transfer of wealth incident to divorce is
consummated in installments has no intrinsic value, apart from the attempt to isolate deflections of income. If requiring periodic payments
causes problems, it should be eliminated in favor of other ways to effectuate section 71's purpose.
And it does cause problems. The following are illustrative. There is too
much litigation on the undeserving issue of whether payments are due
more than ten years after the divorce (and therefore periodic under section
71(c)(2)).1 13 Furnishing living accommodations for the wife can involve a
transfer of real wealth that arguably should generate a tax benefit to the
husband, but fails because the conveyance is a single event. 114 Furthermore, reference to state law is often necessary to determine whether payments ar6 subject to a contingency, and consequently periodic. I'5
Commissioner, 73 T.C. 1113 (1980) (weekly payments of $125 until $19,000 principal sum of debts
paid off treated as property settlement because not subject to contingency of modification under Ohio
law); Martin v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 255 (1979) (payments of $12,500 per year for two years
treated as property settlement because one, partly for wife's attorney fees, which is not ongoing
support, and two, wife had "some property rights").
Cases exist in which payments not subject to contingencies are deemed periodic under I.R.C. § 71
(c) (2), but nonetheless fail to satisfy the support requirement. E.g., Lambros v. Commissioner, 459
F.2d 69 (6th Cir. 1972); Mills v. Commissioner, 442 F.2d 1149 (10th Cir. 1971); Bernatschke v.
United States, 364 F.2d 400 (Ct. Cl. 1966); Gammill v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 921 (1980); Mann v.
Commissioner, 74 T.C. No. 92 (1980); Westbrook v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. No. 101 (1980); Widmerv. Commissioner, 75 T.C. No. 35 (1980).
113. E.g., Estate of Spicknall v. Commissioner, 285 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1961); Wright v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 377 (1974), aff'd, 543 F.2d 593 (7th Cir. 1976); Joslin v. Commissioner, 52
T.C. 231 (1969), aft'd, 424 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1970). Even such a mechanical issue as this one,
which arises under I.R.C. § 71(c) (2), is not totally independent of state law; whether the payments
are legally grounded in the decree, or some earlier document (stipulation, temporary order, or separation agreement) can control whether they satisfy the ten-year rule. Courts even consider the parties'
intent, which would seem entirely irrelevant to whether ten years have elapsed. E.g., Wamack v.
Commissioner, 71 T.C. 541 (1979); Derickson v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. 1325 (1976).
114. See Pappenheimer v. Allen, 164 F.2d 428 (5th Cir. 1947), where the husband was denied a
deduction for the rental value of a house in which the wife was permitted to live. Section 71(d) was an
alternative ground for the disallowance. Another example is where the husband purchases a residence
for the wife and is denied a deduction for the mortgage payments because the wife's receipt is unitary, notwithstanding the periodic receipts of the mortgagee. Van Orman v. Commissioner, 418 F.2d
170 (7th Cir. 1969); Lounsbury v. Commissioner, 321 F.2d 925 (9th Cir. 1963). See generally Note,
Alimony Taxation of Indirect Benefits: A Critique and a Proposal, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 1118,
1125-32, 1138-44 (1966).
115. See text accompanying note 49 supra. The "contingency doctrine" has been criticized for
its inescapable reliance on state law. Note, 9 HARV. J. LEGIs. 156, 166-70 (1971). E.g., Crouser v.
Commissioner, 73 T.C. 1113 (1980). Aside from that, the nearly uniform rule of state law that support payments may be modified upon a showing that the economic status of the parties has changed
moots the issue significantly, once again proving the support-versus-property distinction to be the
determinative factor. See H. CLARK, supra note 68, § 14.9, at 452-54; e.g., Appling v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. 50 (1979).

Washington Law Review

Vol. 56:217, 1981

Other Considerations
The combined effect of making the tax consequences of wealth transfers incident to divorce depend on whether the transfer is in the nature of
support, and in the case of recurring cash transfers, whether they are periodic, is needlessly complex. Wholly apart from the issues of support and
periodicity, merely determining the amount of gain or loss and basis of
property received in a property division where ownership is not disputed,
i.e., where the line between support and property is clear, can be very
complicated. 116 Spouses represented by lawyers who are not thoroughly
116. Where the spouses divide jointly owned property (either community property in a community property state or jointly owned property in a common law state) in substantially equal portions
(asset by asset or in the aggregate), the transaction is nontaxable and the basis in the property remains
the same. E.g., Walz v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 718 (1935); Rev. Rul. 76-83, 1976-1 C.B. 213;
Rev. Rul. 56-437, 1956-2 C.B. 507. (What appears to be jointly owned property in the traditional
property law sense, however, may be something else. See Forbes v. United States, 472 F. Supp. 840
(D. Mass. 1979) (wife's interest in residence held as tenancy by entireties treated under Massachusetts law as inchoate rights not rising to dignity of property rights); Miller v. Commissioner, 32
T.C.M. 570 (1973) (denying wife's property rights in real estate titled in joint names on ground that
wife had not contributed to acquisition).)
Where one spouse surrenders his or her interest in the jointly owned properly in exchange for the
separately owned property of the other spouse (or for release of the wife's support rights). the first
spouse has engaged in a taxable exchange (gain or loss recognized under § 1001 and § 1012 cost
basis). E.g.. Rouse v. Commissioner, 159 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1947): Edwards v. Commissioner. 22
T.C. 65 (1954); Rev. Rul. 74-347, 1974-2 C.B. 26. It is in this circumstance, where the first spouse
is the wife, that despite the transfer of periodic payments from husband to wife, § 71 does not apply
and the wife has engaged in a taxable sale. The second spouse has one of three possible tax consequences, depending on the type of consideration given for the first spouse's interest in the jointly
owned property: first, if the consideration is cash, the second spouse has simply engaged in a purchase (§1012 cost basis); second, if the consideration is property other than cash, the second spouse
has engaged in a taxable exchange (gain or loss recognized under § 1001 and § 1012 cost basis): and
third, if the consideration is the release of the wife's right to support, the second spouse (the wife) has
no immediate tax consequences (no income under § 71, no gain recognized under § 1001, and a basis
equal to the fair market value of the property received). United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65. 73 n.7
(1962); Rev. Rul. 67-221, 1967-2 C.B. 63. Furthermore, more than one of these three types of
consideration can be combined.
Finally, the rules described in each of the preceding paragraphs are combined in a case where the
first spouse does not entirely surrender his or her interest in the jointly owned property, but receives
less than substantially half. There the first spouse recognizes gain or loss realized on the exchange in
proportion to the relative amount of consideration received from the second spouse that consists of
the second spouse's separately owned property. Carrieres v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 959 (1975).
aff 'd per curiam, 552 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir. 1977). Although Carrieres did not decide the consequences to the second spouse, it follows that to the extent the second spouse used his or her separate
property as consideration for part of the first spouse's interest in the jointly owned property, the
second spouse should have the results described in the preceding paragraph. And to the extent the
second spouse used his or her interest in other jointly owned property as consideration, the results in
the first paragraph should obtain.
To illustrate Carrieres, consider this example: H and W have S100 of community property, consisting of stock worth $20, bonds worth $30 and real estate worth $50. The couple's adjusted basis in
each of these classes of property is $10 less than value, so that the aggregate basis is $70. Upon
divorce, W takes the stock and H takes the bonds and real estate. To make up the difference, H
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skilled in the tax law easily can have an erroneous impression of the tax
consequences of their settlement. Even if the bar had perfect knowledge,
the complexity of the system demands an allocation of resources to ditransfers to W $30 of his separate property. Assume, for simplicity, that W is not in need of ongoing
support and is not entitled to it under state law. Carrieresindicates that W retains the adjusted basis in
the stock of $10, and that of the $10 gain W realized on the exchange [one half of (($50 plus $30)
minus ($40 plus $20))], she must recognize $7.50, which is the following percentage of $10:
75%
H's seprate property
$30
total consideration for
$40
W's interest in bonds and real estate
H should have the same basis in $50 worth of the bonds and real estate as the couple had prior to
divorce because he has merely retained his original $40 interest and has acquired an additional $10
from W in exchange for his $10 interest in the stock. The remaining $30 worth of bonds and real
estate have come his way in a taxable transaction. If the $30 separate property he used as consideration is cash, he has simply made a purchase; but if property other than cash, he has engaged in a
taxable exchange. In either event he will have a cost basis of $30 plus the same basis as before in the
remaining $50 worth of property. But the amount of this basis depends on which property H is
deemed to have acquired in exchange for his interest in the stock, and consequently in which he
retains the old basis. Is it $10 of bonds, $10 of real estate, or some portion of each? Carrieres, 64
T.C. at 966, does not answer this question, stating only that "allocation" problems can arise where
the facts do not make clear which jointly owned assets are being sold for separate property and which
are exchanged for other jointly owned property. (In Carrieres,the wife gave up her interest in only
one community property asset.) The opinion is concerned at that point not with how to determine H's
basis, but how to compute W's recognized gain. However, the very rule which the court announced
seems to obviate tracing which assets are sold for separate property and which are exchanged for
other jointly owned property by resorting to an apportionment approach. Why this approach must
change merely because the wife surrenders her interest in more than one of the jointly owned assets is
not clear. Nor does there appear any reason for not using an apportionment approach to determine H's
basis. Since he purchased 75% of W's interest, he should carry over the old basis in the other 25%
($7.50), which would give him a total basis of $67.50. [Contrast this apportionment result with an
approach which allocates the $30 purchase first to the real estate (total basis of $66.67), or alternatively, first to the bonds (total basis of $68).] If apportionment is used to determine the amount of
gain recognized by the wife, it would seem asymmetrical to use a different approach to determine H's
basis. Such an inconsistency has to confer an unjustified windfall on either the government or one of
the spouses at the expense of one or both of the others. Assigning a basis of $67.50 to H results in an
aggregate basis to both parties of $77.50 after the divorce, which, logically, is greater than the aggregate basis before divorce ($70) by the amount of gain recognized by W ($7.50). Examining the
consequences on an individual basis, however, reveals that of the $30 of gain potential existing before divorce, $7.50 has been taxed to W, $10 remains to be taxed to her when she sells the stock and
$12.50 remains to be taxed to H when he sells the bonds and real estate. This shifting of tax liability
from H to W is not an indictment of Carrieres,rather just an arbitrary consequence of the rule stated
in the first paragraph, upon which Carrieresbuilds, that in an equal division each spouse keeps the
same basis in whatever property he or she ends up with.
To be sure, though, the court's point about "allocation" portends knotty problems where some of
the assets would generate capital gain and others ordinary income. Further complication would be
added if some of the assets would generate a loss; capital losses are of limited deductibility and some
losses are simply not allowed at all. See I.R.C. §§ 1211 (b), 165(c), 267; Siewart v. Commissioner,
72 T.C. 326 (1979). Other provisions capable of magnifying the complexity are I.R.C. §§ 453(e),
453(g) & 1239 (see DeYoe v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 904 (1976)).
An appreciation of the enormous potential for error comes into even sharper focus when all of this
complexity is compounded by the presence of a right to support and the uncertain distinction between
support and property rights. These rules are hardly worth the morass of permutations that they make
possible.
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vorce tax planning that is difficult to justify, and perhaps unfair for taxpayers to bear. The regularity with which large numbers of taxpayers
transfer wealth incident to divorce presents a compelling case for simplicity.
Furthermore, the tax law has always strived to treat taxpayers alike,
regardless of where they happen to live. 117 The annals of federal taxation
do reveal periods in which variations in state laws have forced the imposition of disparate tax consequences on similarly situated taxpayers,1 18 but
Congress usually intervened with legislation to equalize the treatment.1 19
In Davis, the Court agreed that its holding permitted different treatment
among common law and community property states, but refused to step in
where Congress had not. 120 Congress should do so now, to bring about
national uniformity and to discourage the enactment of state laws (or interpretation of them) designed primarily to secure federal tax advantages
for divorcees.
The present regimes for taxing transfers of wealth incident to divorce
have been in place for nearly forty years. Congressional intent to rid the
system's dependence on state law has not been carried out. Indeed, dependence on state law, with all the uncertainty and arbitrariness it can
occasion, is inextricably built into the present regimes. Acceptable tax
consequences can be achieved, and with much greater simplicity, through
alternative rules which more directly implement the underlying policy of
allocating income tax liability according to how the income is divided.
The next time Congress addresses itself to taxation of the individual, it
should seriously consider revamping the treatment of wealth transfers incident to divorce.
PROPOSAL
Prior discussion points to the support-versus-property issue as the main
source of trouble in the present system. The significance of the distinction
under state law between support and property rights should be entirely
117. Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188 (1938).
118. See Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930) (upholding division of tax liability on husband's
salary in community property state); text accompanying notes 17-26 supra (explaining that taxation
of alimony trust income depended on whether husband's support obligation survived divorce under
state law).
119. Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 168, §§ 301, 303, 62 Stat. 110 (now I.R.C. §§ I(a), 6013)
(allowing functional equivalent of community property through joint return of husband and wife);
Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 120, 56 Stat. 816-18 (now I.R.C. §§ 71, 72(k), 215, 682) (taxing
alimony trust income to wife without regard to survival of support obligation under state law).
120. 370 U.S. at 71. One writer suggests that unequal treatment of taxpayers under the rule in
Davis is an unconstitutional application of the Code. Note, 49 So. CAL. L. REV. 1401, 1431 (1976).
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eliminated. That alone, however, tells little about how wealth transfers
incident to divorce should be taxed, if at all.
Federal indicia of property rights could be established and used to isolate those transfers which should not be taxed. For example, the concept
of "property" could be limited to interests which confer the unburdened
right to manage and to transfer the property, in any manner and at any
time. 121 That at least would emasculate state judicial power to decree relatively flimsy marital rights the equivalent of property ownership.122 But
it might encourage the enactment of state laws that expand marital rights
to comport with federal criteria of property ownership. Such laws are
more appropriately influenced by considerations of marriage and divorce,
apart from tax consequences. Furthermore, federal criteria would guarantee continuing dependence on state law to determine whether they are
satisfied.
An equally tenable position is that the settlement of marital wealth
upon divorce should not occasion any income tax consequences. Since
1948 the tax law generally has treated husband and wife as a taxpaying
unit. 123 Uncompensated transfers between spouses have no income tax
significance. 124 For example, a wife is not taxable during marriage on that
portion of her husband's salary that is applied to her support. 125 Nor is
there any authority indicating that the husband is taxable on the appreciation in property he transfers to his wife during marriage to assure her support. 126 It is not readily apparent that these results should change solely
because the transfer is incident to divorce.
The rule in Davis stems from the general principle that liquidation of a
debt with appreciated property should be treated the same as a sale of the
property and application of the proceeds against the debt. But the debt121. See generallyNote, 29 ME. L. REv. 73, 82-87 (1977).
122. See text accompanying note 95-97 supra.
123. Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 168, §§ 301, 303, 62 Stat. 110 (now I.R.C. §§ l(a), 6013).
These provisions, known as the joint return privilege, allow husband and wife to combine their income for purposes of computing tax liability. Technically, however, husband and wife are separate
taxpayers, even when filing jointly. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 116, 1244.
124. Uncompensated transfers are those where the receiving spouse provides no consideration.
The recipient is not subjected to income tax, either because the transfer is in the nature of support or is
a gift. I.R.C. § 102. The transferor may have gift tax consequences. See I.R.C. §§ 2515, 2515A,
2523. A compensated transfer between spouses, such as a sale or exchange, however, is treated the
same as if between strangers. E.g., Nye v. United States, 407 F. Supp. 1345 (M.D.N.C. 1975).
Under certain circumstances, a sale between spouses is treated less favorably than one between
strangers. See I.R.C. §§ 267,453(e), 453(g), 1239.
125. See generally Bittker, A "Comprehensive Tax Base" as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80
HARV. L. REv. 925, 946-47, 976-77 (1967); Bittker, FederalIncome Taxation and the Family, 27
STAN. L. REv. 1389, 1420-22 (1975).
126. The theory of Davis is conceivably applicable to this situation, but the government wisely

has refrained from making this argument.
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the marital obligation of support-exists during marriage as well. Transfers incident to divorce are remnants of marital life that survive divorce;
perhaps present law attaches too much significance to divorce. Beyond
that, the husband who transfers property in satisfaction of his support obligation receives nothing in exchange with which to pay the tax. Also,
some suspect a widespread lack of compliance with Davis. These reasons
have prompted calls from several quarters for legislative overruling of
Davis, usually on the theory that a divorce settlement is like a termination
of a partnership, which generally is a nontaxable event. 127
As emphasized throughout, however, overruling Davis would be good,
but not enough. The treatment of alimony payments must also be addressed. There is a choice here too, which is not made merely by eliminating the state law distinction between support and property rights, and
that choice is easy. The husband's support is not taxed to the wife during
marriage, but it must be afterward. Otherwise husbands will be pressed
beyond their resources by the combination of income tax and alimonyone of the major reasons for the 1942 enactment. 128 Other proposals for
reform of section 71 focus, rightly so, on the support requirement and the
effect of contingencies. 129 The most common theme is a presumption that
payments in excess of ten years are taxable to the wife, unless the parties
elect otherwise. These ideas are good, but their attempt to achieve income
splitting can be realized more directly.
The time has come for specifics. This proposal divides transfers incident to divorce into two categories: one, transfers of wealth owned by the
parties at the time of divorce, regardless of how the wealth was acquired
127. Proposals to overrule Davis by statute and provide for nonrecognition of gain or loss and
carryover basis on one-time transfers are in Committee on Domestic Relations Tax Problems, REPORT, ABA BULL. OFTHE SECTION OF TAXATION, 62, 63-66, (July 1966); REPORT ON THE DAVIS RULE
REGARDING PROPERTY SETTLEMENTS INDIVORCE OR SEPARATION, supra note 66; TREASURY DEP'T, TAX
REFORM STUDIES AND PROPOSALS, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 343 (1969); Note, 49 So. CAL. L. REV. 1401,
1438-39 (1976) (citation to numerous other proposals at 1406-07). Different approaches are in Note,

29 ME. L. REV. 73, 91-103 (1977) (recognition of gain or loss only to extent division is unequal):
Hjorth, Community Property Marital Settlements: The Problem and a Proposal, 50 WASH. L. REV.

231, 264-74 (1974) (in community property state, gain recognized to extent of cash received: imbalance of division treated as sale for separate property or release of marital obligation).
128. See text accompanying notes 12-16 supra. The husband's compelling need for tax relief
obscures the fundamental issue of who ought to be taxable on the portion of the husband's income
which the wife consumes. Taxing the husband, the practice in this country until 1942, is not entirely
illogical. See generally Bittker, A "Comprehensive Tax Base" as a Goal of lncome Tax Reform. 80
HARV. L. REV. 925, 976-77 (1967). But it is entirely impractical.
129. ABA REPORT, supra note 127, at 62-63 (presumption that payments over ten years are for
support); Harris, supra note 42, at 82-84 (presumption that contingent payments and payments over
ten years are for support); Note, supra note 52, at 168-70 (elimination of contingency rule; presumption that payments over ten years are for support); Kuntz, supra note 66, at 222-23 (elimination of
support requirement; payments deductible to husband and includible to wife if parties so elect).
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and which spouse is the record or legal owner; and two, all other transfers.
TransfersofExisting MaritalWealth
This category of transfers encompasses the settlement of all wealth, of
whatever form, owned by the parties at divorce, including property that
one spouse owned before marriage or received as a gift from third parties
during marriage. The division of this wealth, in kind, whether equal or
unequal, should not be taxable to either spouse. The basis in the property
should carry over to the receiving spouse, asset by asset. If a particular
asset is divided, its basis can be allocated between the parties in proportion to the value of the share each party takes. Taxation of the appreciation in this wealth would be deferred until the receiving spouse disposes
of it.
This scheme is open to the customary criticisms, none of which, on
balance, are terribly distressing. Some would view the transfer to a
spouse of separately owned property (especially if brought into marriage)
as a clear case for taxation. Present law allows deferral where the aggregate of jointly owned or community property is split evenly, without regard to the composition of each share. 130 Only an undue respect for academic orderliness warrants immediate taxation where separately owned
property is surrendered for a larger piece of the marital pie.
A corollary is that unequal divisions of existing marital wealth are no
less entitled to deferral than equal divisions. Technicalities of ownership
aside, one must presume that when all is said and done, in most cases
adversaries represented by counsel walk away from divorce with approximately what they deserve, whatever the legal nature of their claims may
be. That largely explains the recent willingness of courts to relax (some
might say abandon) the traditional definition of "property" if doing so
softens the impact of federal tax law on the settlement of marital
wealth. 131 Imposing tax consequences on one spouse or the other because
130. See note 116 supra.
131. In the one-time transfer cases where the husband successfully argued that Davis was distinguishable because the wife was extracting her "property," the perfect overlap of what the recipient
got in the settlement and what was deemed her "property" is more than coincidence. This is especially true where there was no outward evidence of record or legal ownership prior to divorce and the
recipient was awarded substantially more or substantially less than half the marital wealth. See text
accompanying notes 73-93 supra.
In the periodic payment cases where the wife successfully argued that the payments represented
compensation for her "property" (or the husband unsuccessfully argued to the contrary), the failure
of courts to suggest that, although § 71 does not apply, the wife has engaged in a taxable sale of such
"property" is similarly peculiar. See, e.g., the cases discussed in note 100 supra. If the existence of
"property" rights prevented application of § 71, some taxable gain to the wife seems logically una-
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the settlement has the appearance of numerical imbalance is a needless
and very confusing fiction.1 32 For taxpayers inadequately represented, a
general rule of nonrecognition at least has the virtue of minimizing surprises.
Another complaint is that deferral is illusory if the receiving spouse
holds the property until death. 133 But that is not an indictment of deferral,
rather of the policy choice to reduce the tax cost of death. Particular transactions, otherwise worthy of deferral, should not be denied because of the
eventual cleansing effect of death.
A strict carryover basis rule would mean that assets taken by the respective spouses would carry uneven tax liabilities, even where the division is equal, unless the bases in the shares were also equal. Providing an
election to allocate basis among the assets would alleviate the disparity.
Such an election could facilitate an acceptable division that otherwise
would unfairly burden one of the parties, such as the husband taking low
basis stock in a family business and the wife receiving an approximately
equal amount of high basis property. If the rules are to be rewritten, however, they should be simple, uncomplicated by qualifications and exceptions with potential for disagreement. Spouses with difficult issues to negotiate probably are well advised and can resort to other provisions to
"equalize" their shares. A strict carryover basis rule is preferable.
A general rule of nonrecognition of gain or loss and carryover basis
would function smoothly in community property states as well as common law states. Contrary to what may be a popular view, the tax consequences of property divisions in community property states involve
134
nearly the same level of complexity that arises in common law states.
A simpler rule should be welcome everywhere.
Carryover basis has the added benefit of eliminating a tax on "capital"
where certain types of income-producing property are transferred to the
wife. For example, a wife is now fully taxable on annuity payments under
a policy purchased for her by the husband, even though part of the payments represent the husband's cost. 135 A carryover of his cost would envoidable unless the source of the periodic payments is other jointly owned property, which in most
cases is factually unlikely. See note 116 supra.
132. For a discussion of the myriad variations, see note 116 supra; Hjorth, supra note 127, at
239-50.
133. Inherited property has a basis equal to its fair market value at the date of the decedent's
death. I.R.C. § 1014. Congress experimented briefly with a carryover basis rule, now defunct.
I.R.C. § 1023 (repealed by Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980, § 401,94 Stat. 299 (1980)).
134. See Hjorth, supra note 127, at 274-75; Furgatch v. Commissioner, 74T.C. No. 87 (1980);
Westbrook v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. No. 101 (1980); Wamack v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 541
(1979); Carrieres v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 959 (1975), aff'd per curiam, 552 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir.
1977) (discussed at note 116 supra).
135. See note 38 and text accompanying notes 35-38 supra.
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able the wife to exclude from income the same portion of the payments
36
which the husband would exclude were he the recipient. 1
TransfersNot Out ofExisting MaritalWealth
This second category of transfers corresponds roughly with payments
now described in section 71, but with important modifications. First, this
category would not encompass income from property which the husband
transferred to the wife, outright or in trust. Such receipts would be taxable
to the wife according to general rules applicable to property owners and
trust beneficiaries. 137 Second, there would be no requirement that the
transfer be in the nature of support, nor that it be periodic (as that term is
now known).
What that leaves, simply, are all transfers from husband to wife that are
incident to divorce, except those coming from the pool of marital wealth
in existence at the time of divorce. Almost always, these transfers would
be recurring cash payments-what the divorce court likely would call alimony, support or maintenance. Such payments would be deductible to
the husband and ordinary income to the wife, limited, however, to the
38
husband's gross income for the year of the transfer. 1
Confining this regime to transfers not out of existing marital wealth
assures that it would perform only an income-splitting function. To be
sure, future receipts of the husband wouldn't necessarily be income, but
limiting the tax consequences of the transfer to the husband's gross income guarantees that the rule would not transcend its narrow purpose-to
shift tax liability only to the extent the husband must turn over his income
39
to the wife. 1
Assuming this approach has merit, one might be tempted to give it further precision. The husband could be treated as a conduit, allowing the
wife to report an aliquot portion of her receipt as having the saihe character as the husband's overall receipts (ordinary income, capital gain, taxexempt interest, etc.), instead of all as ordinary income. The character of
payments from a trust to a beneficiary pass through in this way. 140 Aside
from the merits, the quest for simplicity is sufficient reason to reject the
idea. Former spouses often are not on the best of terms; the system should
not depend on open lines of communication between them.
136. Conforming amendments to present law are outlined in Peschel, supra note 38, at 249-50.
137. See id.;I.R.C. §§ 652, 662, 682.
138. Child support payments would remain taxable to the husband. See I.R.C. § 71(b).
139. See note 33 supra regarding limitations already imposed on the tax benefit generated by
alimony deductions.
140. I.R.C. §§ 652(b), 662(b).
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Overlap
Circumstances could arise making it difficult to determine whether a
transfer was out of marital wealth in existence at divorce. (Uncertainty as
to the source of wealth transfers is the essence of problems in the present
system.) For example, recurring cash payments could be from salary,
from income on, or proceeds from a subsequent sale of, the husband's
share of marital wealth, or from that part of his share which consisted of
cash. Tracing would not be desirable, nor would it have much point. A
solution would be to classify a cash transfer as out of existing wealth only
where the divorce papers indicate that is what the wife is taking. Admittedly, that may be ambiguous, but the problem seems relatively small. It
arises only with cash (other assets are identifiable) and becomes moot
once the wife has received as much cash as was on hand at divorce.
Moreover, the bias should be in favor of shifting the tax liability on recurring payments. The wife's ability at divorce to extract existing wealth taxfree suggests strongly that future payments come from the husband's future receipts.
Another problem is where a particular asset (such as a residence, annuity, or insurance policy) is purchased for the wife specifically to fulfill
the terms of the settlement. Such property could be treated as existing
marital wealth if purchased within a prescribed period of proximity to the
divorce, or in accordance with the divorce papers. A more difficult issue
concerns the consequences of continuing payments by the husband to
fund the purchase, such as home mortgage payments or insurance premiums. Such payments should be deductible to the husband and income to
the wife only if the source of the payments is not existing marital wealth,
and if they confer a present benefit on the wife. Whether the source of the
payments is existing marital wealth presents an identification problem
similar to that discussed above. For the same reason, here again the bias
should be in favor of finding that the payments do not come from marital
wealth in existence at divorce. The wife's argument, for example, that the
husband's mortgage payments represent her share of the marital wealth
belies her failure to obtain the share outright. The husband may wish to
postpone diminution of his wealth, but if the resources for an immediate
transfer are present at the time of divorce, the wife should demand what is
hers immediately. If the resources are not then available, there is reason
to suspect that the wife's argument is specious.
Whether recurring payments that do not go directly to the wife, such as
mortgage payments and insurance premiums, confer a present benefit on
her sufficient to warrant taxation has troubled the courts for years. 14 1 This
141.

E.g., Stevens v. Commissioner, 439 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1971); Seligmann v. Commissioner.

Divorce Wealth Transfers
is not the place to rehash those issues, other than to express agreement
with complaints that the courts often have failed to perceive the economic
benefit that inures to the wife when a husband provides living accommo42
dations or protection against death. 1
Revenue Effect
Although one can only speculate, the revenue effect of this proposal is
probably very small. 143 Gain of the type recognized in Davis probably
goes unreported in the vast majority of cases, either through ignorance or
reporting positions of varying legitimacy. The loss of this revenue would
be insubstantial. Moreover, universal application of a carryover basis rule
would generate more future revenue than the present system by foreclosing the claim to a stepped-up basis by wives in the position of Mrs. Davis.
Revenue loss caused by shifting tax liability on virtually all recurring
cash payments to wives, who usually are in lower tax brackets, would be
greater, but again relatively insubstantial. Indeed, the amount lost may be
more than offset by the inability of wives under this proposal to take the
reporting position that recurring payments (doubtless claimed as a deduction by the husband) are nontaxable installments of their property rights.
Hardship
This proposal places a premium on hard and fast rules, possibly at the
expense of what some would view as fairness. In many situations the
wife's overall tax burden would be minimized by taking as much of the
property owned by the parties as is possible, and relying less on future
payments. A variety of circumstances could make such a settlement imprudent or difficult to attain: the husband may not cooperate; the property
may be insufficient or not lend itself to such a division; local law or custom may prohibit or frown on such a division; or the wife's (and the children's) well-being may be more secure with a larger ongoing income.
Furthermore, if the wife does receive substantial future payments, she no
longer would have the argument that they are nontaxable installments of
her property rights.
But the compensating benefits are more impressive. In those cases
where a partition of existing wealth is not practical, for example where
207 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1953); Wright v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 377 (1974); Brodersen v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 412 (1971); Taylor v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 120 (1965); Bradley v. Commissioner,
30T.C. 701 (1958).
142. See Note, supranote 114.
143. See notes 10 & 66 and accompanying text supra.

Washington Law Review

Vol 56:217, 1981

most of the wealth is tied up in a business managed by the husband, the
wife can negotiate for increased future payments to compensate for her
increased tax burden. Spouses in such situations are likely to be well advised. The tax law should not sacrifice the general need for clarity to accommodate the interests of a relatively few taxpayers who are best able to
protect those interests themselves.
Inevitably cases would arise in which this proposal would appear to
penalize one party or the other. They arise under present law as well. A
workable formula, pleasing to everyone, is unattainable; an attempt to
find it would be fatuous. In most cases, the results of a given settlement
under this proposal would not differ significantly from the results under
present law. But the sorely needed certainty and uniformity in the treatment of transfers incident to divorce would be much improved. Parties at
least could negotiate their differences with predictable consequences.
And when the courts must step in, they could treat taxpayers evenly,
wherever they live.
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